OpenAI: Chinese Cops Used ChatGPT to Plan Dissident Smear Ops
#AI #ChatGPT #OpenAI #Cybersecurity #CyberThreats #Cyberattacks #Hackers #Disinformation #AIMisinformation #Censorship #AISafety #AISecurity #China #InfluenceOperations #TransnationalRepression
OpenAI report reveals Chinese influence campaign exposed through ChatGPT use
Below is a unified, clean, publication-ready version of the research on **soft power**, written in neutral analytical style and translated fully into English. No playful tone, no persona elements — just a clear professional text.
**Title**
Soft Power: How States Influence Without Coercion and Why Political Science and Intelligence Services Study It
**Introduction**
Soft power refers to a state's ability to shape the preferences, decisions, and behavior of other actors not through coercion or economic pressure, but through attractiveness, legitimacy, and credibility. Culture, education, media, values, international institutions, and national branding form the visible layer of this influence. Beneath that surface lies a strategic mechanism: the ability to set agendas, define narratives, and cultivate long-term loyalty across societies and elites.
For political science, soft power is a tool for understanding how global influence works in a world where military force and economic leverage no longer guarantee compliance. For intelligence services, soft power represents a terrain of indirect influence — the environment in which alliances are shaped, public opinion is molded, and decision-makers form their perceptions and risk assessments. Today’s geopolitical competition increasingly unfolds not on battlefields but in cultural exports, educational programs, media ecosystems, expert networks, and information flows.
**Core Analysis**
Soft power, introduced as a concept by Joseph Nye, complements traditional "hard power" (military and economic force) by focusing on persuasion and attraction. Its effectiveness depends on perceived legitimacy, cultural resonance, credibility of institutions, and narrative consistency.
Modern states combine soft and hard power into so-called *smart power* strategies. Democratic systems typically emphasize openness, cultural presence, and institutional cooperation. Authoritarian regimes, while also deploying soft power, often rely on “sharp power,” which uses manipulative or opaque information practices to influence foreign publics and institutions.
Soft power operates across several levels:
**Cultural influence**: Media, film, music, literature, language.
**Educational influence**: Scholarships, academic exchanges, research partnerships.
**Institutional influence**: International organizations, NGOs, think tanks.
**Narrative influence**: Global reputation, national values, political identity.
**Technological and digital influence**: Social networks, digital ecosystems, communication platforms.
Intelligence communities analyze soft power as part of the broader concept of strategic influence. This includes understanding how rival states extend cultural or informational reach, cultivate proxies or sympathetic elites, shape foreign debates, and exploit vulnerabilities in open societies.
**Target Audience**
This material is designed for readers interested in international relations, political strategy, intelligence analysis, information influence, security studies, and contemporary geopolitics. It will be useful for political scientists, policymakers, OSINT specialists, journalists, students in global affairs, and anyone seeking to understand how modern states compete without direct coercion.
**Bibliography**
Joseph S. Nye — *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*.
Joseph S. Nye — *The Future of Power*.
Hans Morgenthau — *Politics Among Nations*.
Robert Keohane — *Power and Interdependence* (with Nye).
Janice Bially Mattern — works on discursive power.
Christopher Walker — research on “sharp power”.
RAND Corporation — studies on influence operations.
CEPA — reports on strategic communication and foreign influence.
Chatham House — analyses of global soft-power competition.
IISS — geopolitical influence assessments.
Brookings Institution — comparative studies of U.S., EU, China, Russia.
Carnegie Endowment — research on authoritarian influence strategies.
*Oxford Handbook of Soft Power* — comprehensive academic overview.
**Hashtags**
#softpower #geopolitics #internationalrelations #politicalscience #intelligence #strategicinfluence #foreignpolicy #informationinfluence #diplomacy #globalpolitics #securitystudies #statecraft #powerdynamics #sharpower #publicdiplomacy #influenceoperations #nationalbranding #globalstrategy #politicalanalysis #thinktanks #discoursepower #culturalpower #globalinfluence
If you want, I can also format this into an article layout, add sections on case studies, or expand the intelligence-analysis angle.
Google terminates over 18,500 channels in Q3 2025 influence operations: Google's TAG removes 18,532 YouTube channels across July through September 2025, targeting coordinated influence operations from Russia, China, and seven other countries. https://ppc.land/google-terminates-over-18-500-channels-in-q3-2025-influence-operations/ #Google #YouTube #InfluenceOperations #DigitalSecurity #CyberSecurity
How China waged an infowar against U.S. interests in the Philippines
🇬🇧🕵️🧑💻🧑🏫 The British Computer Society has published my recent presentation for them in London, on my investigations of international influence operations and misinformation spread affecting the UK, and OSINT/SOCMINT basics.
▶️ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PBhHVtKbvkI
#disinformation #misinformation #informationWarfare #propaganda #influenceOperations #OSINT #SOCMINT #London #UK
MON SEP/15: 🇬🇧🕵️🧑💻🧑🏫 I'll be at the British Computer Society (BCS, The Chartered Institute for IT) London, presenting observations from my infop/misinfo investigations, with OSINT/SOCMINT basics.
Details and registration (in-person or online) at https://www.bcs.org/events-calendar/2025/september/hybrid-disinformation-in-practice-tips-and-tools/
#UK #influenceOperations #misinformation #disinformation #OSINT #SOCMINT #London #tech #platforms
Thursday, August 28, 2025
Admission of guilt: Ukraine blasts Russia’s planned withdrawal from torture prevention convention — Powerful explosion rocks Russian oil pipeline supplying Moscow — Across occupied Ukraine, Russia has caused a devastating water crisis it cannot fix — [vlog] Why Russia’s war won’t end yet … and more
https://activitypub.writeworks.uk/2025/08/thursday-august-28-2025/
Are these just headlines or is there something bigger under the surface? Which one are you most curious about—maybe Greenland’s role or energy sneaks? What’s being buried in all this noise?
#GlobalTensions #GreenlandDiplomacy #USOpenDrama #EnergyConflict #InfluenceOperations
The Netherlands’ security agency has officially listed Israel as a potential foreign threat for the first time—alongside Iran and Russia.
#Israel #Netherlands #DutchSecurity #ForeignThreat #InternationalPeace #Counterterrorism #InfluenceOperations #Surveillance #PegasusSpyware #ICC #WarCrimes #GlobalSecurity #HumanRights #InternationalLaw #Disinformation #Diplomacy #SecurityConcerns #WorldNews #SukhSandhu #VerifiedJournalism #Geopolitics #SecurityThreats #Europe
Google dismantles 9,800+ channels in Q2 2025 coordinated influence operations: Google's Threat Analysis Group terminates thousands of YouTube channels and blocks domains across multiple platforms in coordinated influence campaign crackdowns spanning seven countries. https://ppc.land/google-dismantles-9-800-channels-in-q2-2025-coordinated-influence-operations/ #Google #YouTube #InfluenceOperations #DigitalSecurity #SocialMedia
#OpenAI disrupted 10 #influenceoperations using its AI tools, including four likely originating in #China, utilising tactics like social engineering, surveillance, false impressions. https://www.npr.org/2025/06/05/nx-s1-5423607/openai-china-influence-operations?eicker.news #tech #media #news
🎭 Can influence operations really deceive cyber adversaries?
Don’t miss Ondrej Nekovar's Lightning Talk at #Honeynet2025, on Cyber Counterintelligence, where he’ll explore how deception and influence operations intersect to mislead attackers and protect strategic interests. Learn why deception isn’t just useful—it’s essential in today’s cyber domain.
🗓️ June 2–4, 2025
🔗 https://prague2025.honeynet.org
#CyberDeception #Counterintelligence #InfluenceOperations #Honeynet #Infosec #SecurityConference
🔎 FIMI is both narrower and broader than traditional disinfo concepts.
❌ Narrower: It only applies to foreign actors—domestic disinformation is excluded.
✅ Broader: It doesn’t require false information—manipulative tactics alone are enough.
This behavior-based focus aligns with EU strategic needs, but makes it harder for science to systematically study what qualifies as FIMI and how to measure it.
#Meta stops fact-checking, China launches #DeepSeek, China & Russia interfere in elections in Spain, Germany & Croatia, EU investigates X support for German far right.
Read more in latest edition of perspicacity @ https://tinyurl.com/y9ajdj24 😊
9/10 🚨 Disinformation is a versatile, evolving threat.
It’s not just about individual fake news stories—it’s about long-term, adaptive attacks on democratic systems.
🎯 Key takeaway from the paper:
🛡️ Defenses must be just as adaptable as the threats they counter.
🔄 Cross-institutional cooperation is vital.
📊 We need sector-specific AND integrated threat analyses.
3/10 📌 FIMI, Cognitive Warfare & Hybrid Threats—how do they differ?
🛰️ FIMI: Tactical manipulation of the information space—often used by foreign actors (e.g., Russia, China) to mislead, polarize, or destabilize.
🧠 Cognitive Warfare: Long-term strategy targeting how people think, process info & form beliefs.
⚔️ Hybrid Threats: Disinfo is one tool in a broader toolkit—including cyber, military, economic coercion.
