#dataExfiltration

2026-02-02

ShinyHunters is abusing trusted cloud services to exfiltrate data — blending in to stay invisible. When legit platforms are weaponized, detection must focus on behavior. ☁️🕵️‍♂️ #ThreatActors #DataExfiltration

thehackernews.com/2026/01/mand

Ars Technica Newsarstechnica@c.im
2026-01-14

A single click mounted a covert, multistage attack against Copilot arstechni.ca/kkdK #dataexfiltration #promptinjections #Security #copilot #Biz&IT #LLMs #AI

Ars Technica Newsarstechnica@c.im
2026-01-08

ChatGPT falls to new data-pilfering attack as a vicious cycle in AI continues arstechni.ca/QKxA #dataexfiltration #promptinjections #Security #chatbots #Biz&IT #AI

N-gated Hacker Newsngate
2026-01-07

🤖 Oh look, another AI tool built with the security prowess of Swiss cheese 🧀. Notion AI and its fancy billion-dollar acquisition, now with bonus features: data exfiltration galore! 🕵️‍♂️ Because who doesn't enjoy a little unsolicited data sharing? 🙄
promptarmor.com/resources/noti

2025-12-18

New research ‼️ Threat actors are using #phishing tactics to trick users into giving access to #M365 accounts. Successful compromise leads to #accounttakeover, #dataexfiltration, and more. Here’s how it works:

• An attacker uses #socialengineering to trick a user into logging into an application with legitimate #credentials
⬇️
• The service generates a device code and directs the user to input it at Microsoft’s verification URL
⬇️
• Doing so validates the token, giving the threat actor control of the M365 account

🔔 Why does this matter? This technique is being used by both e-crime and state-aligned threat clusters. Since September 2025, we've observed widespread campaigns using these attack flows, suggesting a shift in phishing from targeting passwords to abusing trusted authentication flows.

⚠️ Protect your organization by blocking device code flow where possible, requiring compliant or joined devices, and enhancing user awareness of this threat.

See our blog to learn more about this malicious tactic and the threat actor clusters behind it. brnw.ch/21wYtdq

Redirection to adding authorized device.
2025-12-05

When a company suffers a cyberattack, there is one line you can almost set your watch by: "At this time, we have seen no evidence that sensitive data was accessed" #Ransomware #DataExfiltration #Transparency dysruptionhub.com/no-evidence-

Ransomware Is Evolving Faster Than Defenders Can Keep Up — Here’s How You Protect Yourself

1,505 words, 8 minutes read time.

By the time most people hear about a ransomware attack, the damage is already done—the emails have stopped flowing, the EDR is barely clinging to life, and the ransom note is blinking on some forgotten server in a noisy datacenter. From the outside, it looks like a sudden catastrophe. But after years in cybersecurity, watching ransomware shift from crude digital vandalism into a billion-dollar criminal industry, I can tell you this: nothing about modern ransomware is sudden. It’s patient. It’s calculated. And it’s evolving faster than most organizations can keep up.

That’s the story too few people in leadership—and even some new analysts—understand. We aren’t fighting the ransomware of five years ago. We’re fighting multilayered, human-operated, reconnaissance-intensive campaigns that look more like nation-state operations than smash-and-grab cybercrime. And unless we confront the reality of how ransomware has changed, we’ll be stuck defending ourselves against ghosts from the past while the real enemy is already in the building.

In this report-style analysis, I’m laying out the hard truth behind today’s ransomware landscape, breaking it into three major developments that are reshaping the battlefield. And more importantly, I’ll explain how you, the person reading this—whether you’re a SOC analyst drowning in alerts or a CISO stuck justifying budgets—can actually protect yourself.

Modern Ransomware Doesn’t Break In—It Walks In Through the Front Door

If there’s one misconception that keeps getting people burned, it’s the idea that ransomware “arrives” in the form of a malicious payload. That used to be true back when cybercriminals relied on spam campaigns and shady attachments. But those days are over. Today’s attackers don’t break in—they authenticate.

In almost every major ransomware attack I’ve investigated or read the forensic logs for, the initial access vector wasn’t a mysterious file. It was:

  • A compromised VPN appliance
  • An unpatched Citrix, Fortinet, SonicWall, or VMware device
  • A stolen set of credentials bought from an initial access broker
  • A misconfigured cloud service exposing keys or admin consoles
  • An RDP endpoint that never should’ve seen the light of day

This shift is massive. It means ransomware groups don’t have to gamble on phishing. They can simply buy their way straight into enterprise networks the same way a burglar buys a master key.

And once they’re inside, the game really begins.

During an incident last year, I watched an attacker pivot from a contractor’s compromised VPN session into a privileged internal account in under an hour. They didn’t need to brute-force anything. They didn’t need malware. They just used legitimate tools: PowerShell, AD enumeration commands, and a flat network that offered no meaningful resistance.

This is why so many organizations think they’re doing enough. They’ve hardened their perimeter against yesterday’s tactics, but they’re wide open to today’s. Attackers aren’t battering the gates anymore—they’re flashing stolen IDs at the guard and strolling in.

Protection Strategy for Today’s Reality:
If your externally facing systems aren’t aggressively patched, monitored, and access-controlled, you are already compromised—you just don’t know the attacker’s timeline. Zero Trust isn’t a buzzword here; it’s the bare minimum architecture for surviving credential-driven intrusions. And phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2, WebAuthn) is no longer optional. The attackers aren’t breaking locks—they’re using keys. Take the keys away.

Ransomware Has Become a Human-Operated APT—Not a Malware Event

Most news outlets still describe ransomware attacks as if they happen all at once: someone opens a file, everything locks up, and chaos ensues. But in reality, the encryption stage is just the final act in a very long play. Most organizations aren’t hit by ransomware—they’re prepared for ransomware over days or even weeks by operators who have already crawled through their systems like termites.

The modern ransomware lifecycle looks suspiciously like a well-executed red-team engagement:

Reconnaissance → Privilege Escalation → Lateral Movement → Backup Destruction → Data Exfiltration → Encryption

This isn’t hypothetical. It’s documented across the MITRE ATT&CK framework, CISA advisories, Mandiant reports, CrowdStrike intel, and pretty much every real-world IR case study you’ll ever read. And every step is performed by a human adversary—not just an automated bot.

I’ve seen attackers spend days mapping out domain trusts, hunting for legacy servers, testing which EDR agents were asleep at the wheel, and quietly exfiltrating gigabytes of data without tripping a single alarm. They don’t hurry, because there’s no reason to. Once they’re inside, they treat your network like a luxury hotel: explore, identify the vulnerabilities, settle in, and prepare for the big finale.

There’s also the evolution in extortion:
First there was simple encryption.
Then “double extortion”—encrypting AND stealing data.
Now some groups run “quadruple extortion,” which includes:

  • Threatening to leak data
  • Threatening to re-attack
  • Targeting customers or partners with the stolen information
  • Reporting your breach to regulators to maximize pressure

They weaponize fear, shame, and compliance.

And because attackers spend so long inside before triggering the payload, many organizations don’t even know a ransomware event has begun until minutes before impact. By then it’s too late.

Protection Strategy for Today’s Reality:
You cannot defend the endpoint alone. The malware is the final strike—what you must detect is the human activity leading up to it. That means investing in behavioral analytics, log correlation, and SOC processes that identify unusual privilege escalation, lateral movement, or data staging.

If your security operations program only alerts when malware is present, you’re fighting the last five minutes of a two-week attack.

Defenders Still Rely on Tools—But Ransomware Actors Rely on Skill

This is the part no vendor wants to admit, but every seasoned analyst knows: the cybersecurity industry keeps selling “platforms,” “dashboards,” and “single panes of glass,” while attackers keep relying on fundamentals—privilege escalation, credential theft, network misconfigurations, and human error.

In other words, attackers practice.
Defenders purchase.

And the mismatch shows.

A ransomware affiliate I studied earlier this year used nothing but legitimate Windows utilities and a few open-source tools you could download from GitHub. They didn’t trigger a single antivirus alert because they never needed to. Their skills carried the attack, not their toolset.

Meanwhile, many organizations I’ve worked with:

  • Deploy advanced EDR but never tune it
  • Enable logging but never centralize it
  • Conduct tabletop exercises but never test their backups
  • Buy Zero Trust solutions but still run flat networks
  • Use MFA but still rely on push notifications attackers can fatigue their way through

If you’re relying on a product to save you, you’re missing the reality that attackers aren’t fighting your tools—they’re fighting your people, your processes, and your architecture.

And they’re winning when your teams are burned out, understaffed, or operating with outdated assumptions about how ransomware works.

The solution starts with a mindset shift: you can’t outsource resilience. You can buy detection. You can buy visibility. But the ability to respond, recover, and refuse to be extorted—that’s something that has to be built, not bought.

Protection Strategy for Today’s Reality:
Focus on the fundamentals. Reduce attack surface. Prioritize privileged access management. Enforce segmentation that actually blocks lateral movement. Train your SOC like a team of threat hunters, not button-pushers. Validate your backups the way you’d validate a parachute. And for the love of operational sanity—practice your IR plan more than once a year.

Tools help you.
Architecture protects you.
People save you.

Attackers know this.
It’s time defenders embrace it too.

Conclusion: Ransomware Isn’t a Malware Problem—It’s a Strategy Problem

The biggest mistake anyone can make today is believing ransomware is just a piece of malicious software. It’s not. It’s an entire ecosystem—a criminal economy powered by stolen credentials, unpatched systems, lax monitoring, flat networks, and the false sense of security that comes from buying tools instead of maturing processes.

Ransomware isn’t evolving because the malware is getting smarter. It’s evolving because the attackers are.

And the only way to protect yourself is to accept the truth:
You can’t defend yesterday’s threats with yesterday’s assumptions. The ransomware gangs have adapted, industrialized, and professionalized. Now it’s our turn.

If you understand how ransomware really works, if you harden your environment against modern access vectors, if you detect human behavior instead of waiting for encryption, and if you treat security as a practiced discipline rather than a product—you can survive this. You can protect your organization. You can protect your career. You can protect yourself.

But you have to fight the enemy that exists today.
Not the one you remember from the past.

Call to Action

If this breakdown helped you think a little clearer about the threats out there, don’t just click away. Subscribe for more no-nonsense security insights, drop a comment with your thoughts or questions, or reach out if there’s a topic you want me to tackle next. Stay sharp out there.

D. Bryan King

Sources

Disclaimer:

The views and opinions expressed in this post are solely those of the author. The information provided is based on personal research, experience, and understanding of the subject matter at the time of writing. Readers should consult relevant experts or authorities for specific guidance related to their unique situations.

#cisoStrategy #cloudSecurityRisk #credentialTheftAttacks #cyberDefenseFundamentals #cyberExtortion #cyberHygiene #cyberThreatIntelligence #cyberattackEscalation #cybercrimeTrends #cybersecurityLeadership #cybersecurityNewsAnalysis #cybersecurityResilience #dataExfiltration #digitalForensics #doubleExtortionRansomware #edrBestPractices #enterpriseSecurityStrategy #ethicalHackingInsights #humanOperatedRansomware #incidentResponse #lateralMovementDetection #malwareBehaviorAnalysis #mitreAttckRansomware #modernRansomwareTactics #networkSegmentation #nistCybersecurity #patchManagementStrategy #phishingResistantMfa2 #privilegedAccessManagement #ransomwareAttackVectors #ransomwareAwareness #ransomwareBreachImpact #ransomwareBreachResponse #ransomwareDefense #ransomwareDetectionMethods #ransomwareDwellTime #ransomwareEncryptionStage #ransomwareEvolution #ransomwareExtortionMethods #ransomwareIncidentRecovery #ransomwareIndustryTrends #ransomwareLifecycle #ransomwareMitigationGuide #ransomwareNegotiation #ransomwareOperatorTactics #ransomwarePrevention #ransomwareProtection #ransomwareReadiness #ransomwareReport #ransomwareSecurityPosture #ransomwareThreatLandscape #securityOperationsCenterWorkflows #socAnalystTips #socThreatDetection #supplyChainCyberRisk #threatHunting #vpnVulnerability #zeroTrustSecurity

A cybersecurity analyst studies glowing monitors in a dark operations room, reviewing ransomware alerts, lateral movement paths, and encrypted file warnings during a modern cyberattack.
Miguel Afonso Caetanoremixtures@tldr.nettime.org
2025-11-27

"An indirect prompt injection in an implementation blog can manipulate Antigravity to invoke a malicious browser subagent in order to steal credentials and sensitive code from a user’s IDE.

Google Antigravity is susceptible to data exfiltration via indirect prompt injection through the agentic browser subagent.
Antigravity is Google’s new agentic code editor. In this article, we demonstrate how an indirect prompt injection can manipulate Gemini to invoke a malicious browser subagent in order to steal credentials and sensitive code from a user’s IDE.

Google’s approach is to include a disclaimer about the existing risks, which we address later in the article."

promptarmor.com/resources/goog

#CyberSecurity #AI #GenerativeAI #Google #Antigravity #GoogleAntigravity #DataExfiltration #AIBrowser

2025-11-09

How a Simple SVG File Turned Into a Data Exfiltration Vector in an Invoice System
This article reveals a critical vulnerability in an invoice platform's SVG file handling that enables data exfiltration and user tracking. The vulnerability stems from improper sanitization of uploaded SVG files, which are essentially XML with embedded HTML-like capabilities. When users upload SVG files as invoice attachments, the system renders them as-is without sanitization, allowing malicious external resource references to execute automatically when recipients view the files. The exploitation uses SVG's `<image>` and `<use>` tags to reference external URLs, causing the recipient's system to make outbound HTTP requests to attacker-controlled servers upon file access. This enables attackers to track when invoices are opened, capture system metadata including IP addresses and user agents, and potentially escalate to stored XSS or SSRF attacks. The attack affects any recipient who views or downloads the infected invoice, creating a wider attack surface. The proof of concept involves uploading a simple SVG with an embedded external image reference, which triggers automatic network requests when the file is accessed. The impact includes information leakage, user tracking, and potential system compromise. Critical mitigations require implementing proper SVG sanitization, disabling external resource loading, using content security policies, restricting file types, and ensuring all uploaded content is properly validated before rendering. This vulnerability demonstrates how seemingly benign features like image uploads can create serious security risks when input validation is inadequate. #infosec #BugBounty #Cybersecurity #SVG #DataExfiltration #XSS
medium.com/@bytewreaker/how-a-

2025-10-10

Researchers found a new “Camoleak” AI attack targeting GitHub Copilot — silently exfiltrating secrets from generated code. Convenience can’t come at the cost of control. 🧑‍💻🕵️‍♂️ #SecureAI #DataExfiltration

darkreading.com/application-se

2025-10-08

💥 AI dominates enterprise data leakage

💥 AI dominates enterprise data leakage
LayerX’s research proves that AI tools (ChatGPT, Claude, Copilot) are now the largest uncontrolled exfiltration channels, exceeding shadow SaaS or unmanaged file sharing.
- 77% of data leaves via copy/paste
- 67% of AI sessions occur via unmanaged accounts
- High-risk categories: AI, chat, and file storage

💬 How can CISOs enforce visibility and governance over these channels? Follow @technadu for daily enterprise cybersecurity insights.

#AI #DataExfiltration #CyberSecurity #EnterpriseSecurity #LayerX #GenAI

New Research: AI Is Already the #1 Data Exfiltration Channel in the Enterprise
eicker.news ᳇ tech newstechnews@eicker.news
2025-08-25

A vulnerability in #Perplexity #Comet, an #AIbrowser, allows attackers to inject malicious instructions into webpage content. These instructions can be executed by the AI assistant, #bypassing traditional #websecurity mechanisms. The attack demonstrates the need for new security architectures to prevent #unauthorisedactions and #dataexfiltration. brave.com/blog/comet-prompt-in #tech #media #news

2025-06-14

Critical AI vulnerability EchoLeak exposed in Microsoft 365 Copilot! Learn about the zero-click attack and its implications. redoracle.com/News/AI-Data-Lea

Client Info

Server: https://mastodon.social
Version: 2025.07
Repository: https://github.com/cyevgeniy/lmst