#SigStore / #PyPI attestations: #PGP is hard! We must invent a new signing scheme that's so much easier on users.
The tools, after I've spent hours *integrating* them into #Gentoo, and getting them working for everything before:
* Verifying google_auth-2.46.0.tar.gz ...
Provenance signed by a Google Cloud account, but no service account provided; use '--gcp-service-account'
Yeah, I'm sure that's *so much simpler* than PGP.
New blog post out 'FluxCD OCI Artifact Verification'
https://calebwoodbine.nz/fluxcd-oci-artifact-verification/
#fluxcd #kustomize #helm #kubernetes #cncf #homelab #sigstore
New post out 'FluxCD OCI Artifact Verification'
https://calebwoodbine.nz/fluxcd-oci-artifact-verification/
#fluxcd #kustomize #helm #kubernetes #cncf #homelab #sigstore
For the last couple of weeks, I've been deep diving into container supply chain security.
I built a full GitHub Actions demo pipeline:
• Vulnerability scanning
• SBOM generation
• Keyless signing + attestations
• SLSA build provenance
The stack: Trivy, Syft, Cosign, and Sigstore.
Zero long-lived secrets. GitHub Actions uses OIDC to obtain a short-lived certificate, signs the image (and publishes attestations), and records everything in a public transparency log. No keys to rotate or leak.
The post also covers hardened base images (distroless and Docker's new Hardened Images) and how to enforce signatures on the consumer side with Kubernetes admission policies.
Blog + companion repo to fork: https://lnkd.in/gtdNYWW8
#SupplyChainSecurity #SBOM #Sigstore #GitHubActions #DevSecOps #ZeroTrust
Recently moved to exclusively using OCI for deploying through FluxCD.
For when I need Helm, I’m vendoring packages and syncing them to an OCI registry.
Utilising Sigstore, every OCI image is signed in CI and verified by FluxCD via the verify config in OCIRepository resources.
Very both boring and yet exciting changes!
#fluxcd #kustomize #helm #kubernetes #cncf #homelab #sigstore
. For public repositories, attestations generated on GitHub Actions will be written to the #Sigstore Public Good Instance for verification in public on an immutable ledger. For private repositories on #GitHub Enterprise plans, the attestations are written to an internal, completely private database and no information is written to public ledgers or logs.
https://github.blog/news-insights/product-news/introducing-artifact-attestations-now-in-public-beta/
OpenSSF-funded improvements to Sigstore’s rekor-monitor are making transparency logs easier to monitor for malicious package releases and identity misuse.
Great work by @trailofbits, with support from the sigstore maintainer community including Hayden Blauzvern and @mihaimaruseac.
🔗 https://openssf.org/blog/2025/12/19/catching-malicious-package-releases-using-a-transparency-log/
💡 OpenSSF Project Highlight: Sigstore - A Wax Seal of Security for the Digital Era
❓ Why this matters: the Sigstore project is building a modern, transparent trust layer for open source.
Watch this interview and learn more about #Sigstore: https://youtu.be/m5eTw4x33kU?si=JFY3C81VFjBhNIML
🎉 The new #Sigstore Rekor transparency log public dataset is now available on BigQuery!
This dataset makes it easier for researchers to analyze software signing trends & understand how artifacts are signed across the open source ecosystem.
🔗Read: https://openssf.org/blog/2025/10/15/announcing-the-sigstore-transparency-log-research-dataset/
Przygotowałem wstępnie weryfikację autentyczności plików z #PyPI dla #Gentoo.
Wiecie, ten nowy wynalazek, który chroni przed atakami podmieniającymi pliki na PyPI, i upewnia się, że macie do czynienia z oryginalnymi plikami z GitHuba. No bo, jak powszechnie wiadomo, repozytoria na GitHubie i tamtejsze systemy CD są mało prawdopodobnym celem ataków. No i absolutnie nie trzeba się martwić tym, że klucze, repozytoria i te systemy CD są w rękach Microsoftu.
I've drafted support for verification of #PyPI provenance for #Gentoo.
You know, the new fancy thing that protects against supply chain attacks on PyPI, and verifies that you're using genuine #GitHub artifacts. Because, you know, GitHub repositories and deployment pipelines are an unlikely attack vector. And you definitely don't need to worry about #Microsoft owning the keys, the repositories and the pipelines at all.
🚨 The AI wave is here, and with it comes a new cybersecurity battleground.
Discover how open source tools like #Sigstore, and #SLSA-based frameworks can help close these gaps and build more resilient AI systems.
Read the blog and learn how to get involved: https://openssf.org/blog/2025/08/12/securing-ai-the-next-cybersecurity-battleground/
New to OpenSSF or thinking about getting involved? We've got you. 💡
This blog by Ejiro and Sal introduces all our working groups, tools, and projects like #sigstore, #SLSA, and #OpenSSFScorecard.
Start here 👉 https://openssf.org/blog/2025/08/08/from-beginner-to-builder-understanding-openssf-community-and-working-groups/
🚀 NEW on We ❤️ Open Source 🚀
Docker is retiring Content Trust. Nigel Douglas explains what’s changing, why Notary is deprecated, and how to prepare with Sigstore or Notation.
https://allthingsopen.org/articles/docker-content-trust-sigstore-vs-notation
#WeLoveOpenSource #Docker #Containers #Sigstore #Notation #FOSS #CloudNative
🔐 New Case Study: How is Google securing the future of machine learning?
By partnering with #sigstore and the Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF), they’ve implemented model signing that makes AI systems more trustworthy by default.
https://openssf.org/blog/2025/07/23/case-study-google-secures-machine-learning-models-with-sigstore/
1/2
Today I was playing with Minisign and Cosign to evaluate whether it’s worth signing some of my OSS software with something other than PGP.
Here’s my verdict: Minisign is promising… Much easier to use than PGP. That simplicity, of course, comes at the cost of giving up a few features.
#OSS #SoftwareSigning #ArtifactSigning #PGP #Minisign #Cosign #Sigstore
Excited to be running a two day Containerized Security Supply Chain course in Brisbane on the 17th-18 of September with Letsboot at the Octopus Deploy Offices. Check it out:
https://www.letsboot.nz/secure-software-supply-chain
#kubernetes #argocd #golang #securesoftwaresupplychain #sbom #sigstore #letsboot #octopusdeploy
I don't suppose that trusting #sigstore to run a centralized CA and transparency logs just to issue short-lived certs for me to generate signatures is much more secure than #PGP signing using my own keys. I'm just increasing the attack surface...
The whole Googlesque philosophy of "trust us; don't be evil" is contrary to my take on information security.
But I'm also open to anyone convincing me otherwise.
